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Abstract
Central bank communication is widely recognised as crucial to the implementation of mone-
tary policy. This communication should enhance a central bank’s management of the inﬂation
expectations of the ﬁnancial markets as well as the general public — the latter being a part of the
central bank’s audience that has received relatively little research attention. In this paper, the
role of the media in transmitting the SARB’s communication to the general public is explored,
with the aim of improving our understanding of its impact on the expectations channel of the
monetary policy transmission mechanism. A deliberate evaluation of this channel could aid the
design of future strategies to communicate with the general public.
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Keywords: South Africa, central bank communication, consistency, monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism, transparent monetary policy.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Private sector inﬂation expectations are critical to successful monetary policy. It is to an important
extent through the expectations channel of the transmission mechanism that policy changes are
transmitted to interest rates at various horizons along the yield curve (Woodford, 2005), thereby
inﬂuencing economic activity. Recognition of this has encouraged an overwhelming move towards
greater transparency in monetary policy, and communication has consequently become an essential
part of a central bank’s strategy to manage inﬂation expectations in pursuit of price stability As a
result, the academic literature concerning central bank communication has ﬂourished over the past
two decades (Blinder et al, 2008).
Most of this research has focused on the central banks’ communication with the ﬁnancial markets
However, a central bank’s audiences are heterogeneous and not all are equally attentive to central
bank policies, a fact that central banks should bear in mind when designing communication strate-
gies It is impractical to incorporate the full range of this heterogeneity within a single economic
model, but it is possible to identify broad groups with similar characteristics. Blinder and Wyplosz
(2004) divide the central bank’s audience into two groups: the broad public and its political rep-
resentatives (general public) on the one side, and the ﬁnancial markets on the other. Cukierman
(2005) proposes that the general public will be rationally inattentive to short-term ﬂuctuations of
inﬂation if the central bank is credible. The concept of rational inattention is more common in the
ﬁelds of behavioural economics and the economics of information from which this paper will draw
However, recent application of rational inattention to the modelling of the Phillips curve has oﬀered
valuable insights (including Mankiw and Reis 2001, 2001a, 2006, 2006a; Carroll 2002, 2003; Sims
2003, 2005, 2010)
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1The communication tools used by the SARB to promote transparency about monetary policy
include the monetary policy statements, monetary policy forums, the publication of monetary pol-
icy reviews and quarterly bulletins, occasional press releases, speeches by the governor, and the
presentation of a report at least three times a year to the parliamentary portfolio committee on
ﬁnance (SARB, 2006). However, very few members of the general public are ever exposed to these
forms of communication directly. Most monetary policy communication with the general public is
transmitted via the media
This paper focuses on evaluating the role the South African media plays as part of the expecta-
tions channel of the transmission mechanism. The paper does not model the transmission mechanism
via the media so it cannot comment on the nature of the media’s impact on expectations, but the
case is made in the paper that ‘the media matters’ in some way. Furthermore, the role of the me-
dia in the expectations channel of the transmission mechanism is supported by evidence in Reid
(2011) that the inﬂation expectations of the South African general public is explained primarily by
a combination of the inﬂation expectations of the ﬁnancial analysts and past inﬂation. The public
is assumed to be exposed to the inﬂation expectations of the ﬁnancial analysts via media reports
which frequently quote the analysts when evaluating monetary policy.
This paper focuses on communication via a particular segment of the printed press (newspapers),
and draws on existing research in the ﬁelds of political science, communications and economics. The
results reveal notable shortcomings in the evaluation and reporting of monetary policy by the South
African media. They are not adequately fulﬁlling their role of digesting monetary policy information
and thereby promoting transparency or holding the SARB accountable to the public. This in turn
inhibits the successful use of the expectations channel of the transmission mechanism, which inﬂation
targeting is designed to employ. In addition, the regression results don’t show any clear inﬂuence
of the SARB’s intermeeting communication on the media reports. We argue that there is scope for
the SARB to respond to the known shortcomings of media reporting when it communicates with
the public.
2 Monetary policy communication via the media with the
rationally inattentive public
In the broadest practical sense, the objective of central bank communication should be ﬁrstly, for the
message to reach its audience and, secondly, for its message to be perceived as trustworthy If central
bank communication is successful in reaching its audience it has created the opportunity to earn a
reputation for credibility through its decisions and behaviour and to manage inﬂation expectations
in the interests of improving the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy. The challenge is that the extent of
the media’s coverage of monetary policy and the manner in which the message of the central bank
is interpreted and conveyed to the public are the result of a number of interacting inﬂuences and
a r eo n l yv e r yl o o s e l yi n ﬂuenced by the central bank.
In order for a central bank to communicate eﬀectively with the rationally inattentive public it
needs to understand the characteristics and incentives of the media that transmit the central bank
communication to the general public, the professional economists quoted in the media, as well as the
characteristics of the rationally inattentive audience itself. The recognition that the success of the
central bank’s communication depends at least partially on the actions of the media, professional
economists and the rationally inattentive audience highlights the strategic nature of the interaction
between the central bank and its audience (Schotter, 2001; Shelling, 1960).
While the sustained credibility of a central bank is clearly determined by the long-run track
record of monetary policy, this presupposes public understanding of the policy goals against which
the central bank is to be judged. The argument in this paper is no apology for manipulation of the
media by the SARB. It is an argument for the conscious participation of the Bank in the public
discussion on monetary policy. This is in line with McCloskey’s argument that responsible, scientiﬁc
2economists should use language in a conscious manner. According to McCloskey ‘Using scientiﬁc
language wide awake requires attention to the other minds present when you speak’ (1998: xix); and
the purpose of rhetoric should be to ‘engage in mutual enquiry’ rather than to ‘talk someone else
into a preconceived idea’ (1998: xx).
Credible central banks have understood the role of purposeful rhetoric for many years. For, ex-
ample the Bundesbank and Swiss National Bank of the 1970s are viewed as benchmarks for successful
monetary policy The main lessons Bernanke et al (1999: 84) identify from the experience of these
two central banks are that a targeting regime is able to contain inﬂation in the longer run even if it
misses the target in response to short-run considerations; and that a strong commitment to trans-
parency (transparency about the policy objectives and approach, together with clear explanations)
is key to this success.
In South Africa the monetary authorities already use communication extensively. The argument
presented here is simply that there is scope for the SARB to view the discussion from the audience’s
perspective, as portrayed by the media. This perspective, we argue, suggests scope for the SARB
to tailor its communication to suit this segment of the audience. This would allow the SARB, for
example, to react timeously to a misunderstanding of the policy process or goals in the media. The
SARB could,for example, place a formal response in the newspaper, in the spirit of the articles
published in the Business Day shortly after the adoption of inﬂation targeting (Business Day, 2002).
It is important that this should be done in a manner that clariﬁes, rather than stiﬂes the debate.
In summary, an understanding of the incentives facing each of the participants in the strategic
game of monetary policy is essential to inﬂuence the outcome of these interactions (the news reports).
We begin this study with the ‘news’, which is the outcome of this strategic interaction, our objective
being to improve our understanding of the process that produces it
2.1 The sender’s (SARB’s) incentives
Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2009:4) deﬁne persuasive communication as “a message provided by
one agent (a sender) with at least a potential interest in changing the behaviour of another agent (a
receiver).” They argue that the supply of persuasive information is endogenous and is determined by
both senders’ incentives to distort the information and their oﬀsetting incentives to provide accurate
information in order to build a reputation. For example the editor of a newspaper may favour a
certain political bias in his or her newspaper in order to earn political favour (he or she may have an
incentive to distort the information) Alternatively, the editor may be targeting a group of receivers
that place great value on the accuracy of the reporting, providing an incentive for the editor to build
a reputation for accurate and impartial reporting.
Similarly, the use of central bank communication in modern monetary policy implementation is
precisely aimed at persuading the public to behave in a manner that promotes the central bank’s
objectives. Central banks face incentives to build a reputation of being credible. According to
Blinder (2000), both central bankers and academic economists report that they view credibility as
very important to a central bank. Blinder conducted a survey of academic economists and central
bankers, in which he explored why these two groups believed credibility was important to a central
bank and how they believed it could be built1 Although the academic economists and central bankers
did not exactly agree on the relative importance of the seven potential reasons provided to explain
why they viewed credibility as important for a central bank, they did rate all of them as important
(above neutral, 3). Interestingly, both groups of respondents regarded “it is the duty for a central
bank to be truthful” as one of the least important reasons for pursuing credibility, although it was
still regarded as important (rated above neutral, 3) This suggests that the pursuit of credibility is
1Regarding reasons why credibility is important, respondents were provided with seven potential reasons, which
they had to rate along a scale of 1-5, where 1 is ‘unimportant’ and 5 is ‘of the utmost importance’. Six of the reasons
Blinder listed related to how greater credibility would make the goals of the central bank easier to achieve. The 7th
reason suggested was that it was the ‘duty of a central bank to be truthful’.
3endogenous and is strongly inﬂuenced by strategic incentives.
Both central bankers and academic economists believe that a ‘history of living up to its word’
‘central bank independence’ and a ‘history of inﬂation ﬁghting’ are the most important ways to
build credibility2 B a s e do nt h e s eﬁndings, it appears that central banks have a strong incentive to
communicate with their audiences in order to build a reputation. They need to demonstrate, over
time, that the central bank is independent and trustworthy.
In this paper, the focus is on the central bank’s communication with a particular segment of its
audience — the rationally inattentive general public. The following section explores the characteristics
of the general public in order to better understand the incentives they face and to communicate
eﬀectively with them.
2.2 Rationally inattentive general public
The interaction between central banks and ﬁnancial markets has been extensively explored in the
literature, largely due to the increased focus on the management of private sector inﬂation expec-
tations and the relative abundance of high frequency, accurate ﬁnancial market data However, the
ﬁnancial markets comprise only part (albeit an important part) of a central bank’s audience. In
addition, the interaction of the ﬁnancial market with the central bank will necessarily diﬀer from
the rest of the central bank’s audience owing to the role and nature of its business It is rational for
market participants to pay close attention to the communication of the central bank, making their
own judgements about the central bank’s policy primarily from oﬃcial communication (ﬁrst-hand
versus second-hand communication).
In contrast, most of the general public are rationally inattentive to monetary policy as they have
other priorities with regard to their available time and attention Figure 1 illustrates the inﬂation
expectations survey data collected by the Bureau for Economic Research (BER) between the third
quarter of 2000 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2010. The BER surveys four groups of the SARB’s audience
separately, which provides important information by revealing discrepancies between these groups
For example, between the beginning of 2006 and mid to late2007 the inﬂation expectations of the
four groups were very similar. CPIX (the index targeted by the SARB) was within the target range
the majority of the time between mid-2003 and mid-2007, and economic theories and models that
considered only the inﬂation expectations of the ﬁnancial analysts during this period would have
been a fair reﬂection of the actual inﬂationary pressures. In contrast there were large diﬀerences
between the inﬂation expectations of the four groups in 2008 and 2009. During these periods of
higher inﬂation eﬀective communication with the non-ﬁnancial market part of the SARB’s audience
became increasingly valuable in order to contain inﬂationary pressures. In addition, economic models
that do not consider this divergence in inﬂation expectations between the diﬀerent groups potentially
compromise the quality of the model, which in turn will inﬂuence policy decisions.
Both the acquisition and processing of the information concerning monetary policy is costly, and
the public will rationally limit the amount of attention they dedicate to the task (Birchler and Bütler,
2007; Della Vigna, 2007). In Della Vigna’s (2007) review of the empirical evidence on psychology
and economics (a.k.a. behavioural economics), he oﬀers ‘limited attention’ as a possible reason for
non-standard decision making. He decomposes the actual value of the good, (in this case information
communicated by the central bank) into a visible component, v, and an opaque component, o:
U = v + o (1)
However, the perceived value of the information, ˜ U, varies depending on the degree of inattention,
θ, chosen by the general public:
˜ U = v +( 1− θ)0 (2)
2Both central bankers and academic economists ranked the potential methods of building credibility, provided by
Blinder in the survey, in precisely the same order.
4θ is a function of the salience of the information (s) and the number of competing stimuli (N),θ =
(s,N), which are both inﬂuenced by the agenda-setting role of the media (elaborated on in the
following section).
Media articles on monetary policy, which also typically report the views of professional econo-
mists, simplify both the acquisition and processing of the relevant information. According to Morris
and Shin (2002), when decision makers have no private information and are making strategic deci-
sions, even though public information is uncertain or imperfect, more precise information is welfare
enhancing. It is reasonable to assume that the general public has very limited private information
and that they turn to the media as a source of public information (interpretation of central bank
policy and comments from economists). A substantial portion of the adult population of South
Africa reports that they read newspapers so they are likely to be exposed to the communication of
the SARB as presented by these newspapers. According to the South African Advertising Research
Foundation’s All Media and Products Surveys (SAARF AMPS, 2007, 2008, 2009) about 26.5% —
31.5% of South Africa’s adult population report reading any AMPS daily newspaper, and about 33%
— 35.5% report reading any AMPS weekly newspaper. Given the above description of the rationally
inattentive public’s media consumption patterns, comprehensive management of a central bank’s
communication strategy should involve an understanding of the media’s role in transmitting and
interpreting the central bank’s original message
2.3 The role of the media in monetary policy communication
News is a commodity, the production of which depends on supply and demand (Hamilton, 2004).
Della Vigna and Gentzkow (2009) suggest that incentives facing the media depend on both consumer
demand and supply-side incentives. Proﬁtable media ﬁrms obviously react to consumer demand by
aiming to produce a product that consumers will choose to purchase. This could result in media
reports with varying levels of objectivity, depending on the target market’s demand for accuracy
versus entertainment or aﬃliation. In addition, the ﬁrm will face supply-side incentives to distort
reporting, such as the personal views of the editor or pressure exerted by politicians and advertisers.
The news report is the product of the interaction between these forces of demand and supply.
Understanding that the press is not a passive conduit of central bank communication complicates
the challenge of communicating with the public. Inﬂuenced by various incentives, the media can
either aide the central bank by interpreting the central bank’s message in such a way that the public
understands it, or it can hinder the communication for example by pursuing provocative, newsworthy
headlines (Filardo and Guinigundo, 2008).
For the central bank’s communication to be successful, it must be judged by the media as
interesting or important enough to be included as news (it must reach the public), and the message
must be accepted by the public as appropriate. In order to reach the public, the central bank’s
communication would need to dominate other news and communication competing for the public’s
attention (N and s from equation 2 above). Filardo and Guinigundo (2008) identify the potential
for an information paradox to exist in this situation, where the public rationally judges it to be
unnecessary to use resources to monitor the decisions and behaviour of a central bank that is
credible — especially if this central bank is operating in an economic environment with low and
stable inﬂation. If the public believes that the central bank has both the ability and incentive to
control inﬂation in the medium- to long-term, the inﬂation expectations of the public are anchored to
the inﬂation target Under these circumstances, the central bank should experience greater ﬂexibility
and require less aggressive adjustments of the monetary policy stance to achieve their goals.
Between the 1930s and 1970s, the prevailing consensus was that the eﬀects of mass communication
on the attitudes of those that receive the messages were minimal (Roger, Hart and Dearing, 1997,
Scheufele and Tweksbury 2007). However, when McCombs and Shaw (1972) changed the research
question slightly, from whether media had a direct eﬀect on the audience’s attitudes, to whether the
media’s coverage of an issue inﬂuenced how important (or salient) the issue was considered by the
5audience, their results challenged the mainstream view. This agenda-setting research has expanded
and deepened substantially since then, adopting a number of diﬀerent approaches to answer the
question — ‘Does the media matter?’
This avenue of research has been productively applied to the question of whether the mass media
has political inﬂuence. In 2007 two inﬂuential empirical studies were published to address this issue,
one focusing on television and the other on newspaper reports. Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007)
used the fact that, for technical reasons, the conservative FOX Media Channel was introduced to
only some channel systems in the US before the 2000 presidential elections to set up a natural
experiment. Changes in support for the Republican Party could then be compared across areas that
had access to Fox News and those that did not. They found that exposure to the conservative news
coverage had a signiﬁcant and sizeable impact, estimating that it persuaded between 3 8 percent
of its non-Republican voters to vote for the Republican Party. In the other study, Gerber, Karlan
and Bergan (2007) set up a ﬁeld experiment in Washington, three weeks before the 2005 Virginia
gubernatorial elections in the USA to measure the eﬀect of newspapers on voting behaviour. They
contacted 1800 people and randomly oﬀered 25% of them a free subscription to the Washington Post
(biased toward the Democratic presidential candidate) and another 25% of them a subscription to
the Washington Times (biased towards the Republican candidate) Using surveys, they were able to
investigate how the political opinions of the respondents of the control group and the two treatment
groups compared over the three weeks. They found that even exposure of only three weeks to
either newspaper increased the chances that the reader would vote (it increased the salience of the
election), but that regardless of which paper the people in the treatment groups received they were
more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate, suggesting that the actual information content
rather than the slant of the newspapers had a greater inﬂuence on readers Although the results of
the two experiments diﬀered slightly regarding the impact of media bias on the political opinions
of the public, they both showed that exposure to the mass media did have some inﬂuence on the
political behaviour of the public.
In conclusion, agenda-setting research suggests that ‘the media does matter’ and that it responds
to incentives in the production of ‘news’ (it is not a passive conduit of communication) A central
bank (the senders) should therefore monitor the role of the media in transmitting its communication
to the general public (the receiver) in order to improve the eﬀectiveness of its monetary policy.
Given the technical skills required to understand and evaluate monetary policy, the media are also
inﬂuenced by the analyses of professional economists. The incentives faced by these professional
economists and their inﬂuence on the ‘news’ reports are explored in the following section
2.4 Professional economists
Professional economists are extensively quoted in these kinds of media reports. The economists are
viewed as specialists, who are able to interpret and evaluate the SARB’s policies. They are also
viewed as independent of the SARB and therefore their opinion is regarded as a more trustworthy
reﬂection of how these policies inﬂuence the private sector.
As third parties in the communication process, professional economists face interesting incen-
tives. Using the inﬂation expectations surveys of Reuters and the Bureau for Economic Research
(BER), Ehlers (2010) recently provided empirical evidence indicating that although the inﬂation
expectations of ﬁnancial analysts in South Africa cannot be classiﬁed as naïve and they are compar-
atively more accurate than those of the trade unions and the business sector, they are not formed in
a fully rational manner either Ehlers performed empirical tests that evaluated the extent to which
the inﬂation expectations of the ﬁnancial analysts were weakly rational (unbiased and eﬃcient), suf-
ﬁciently rational (outperform the forecasts of other naïve models) and strictly rational (outperform
the forecasts of a suite of models). She concluded that on average the inﬂation expectations of South
African ﬁnancial analysts do not satisfy the conditions for weak rationality (they are unbiased, but
ineﬃcient) and tests results for the extent to which they are suﬃciently rational are mixed, so they
6can consequently not be classiﬁed as strictly rational either. Since the 1990s a branch of the litera-
ture has investigated the possibility that professional economists could have ‘strategic’ reasons for
making forecasts that are not rational, rather than that they are myopic or lack the skill to forecast
more accurately (Ashiya, 2009) These studies suggest that economists face two incentives that are
potentially in conﬂict — an incentive to forecast as accurately as possible and some strategic incentive
to bias their forecasts (to pursue their own selﬁnterest).
Some reasons have been proposed to explain this strategic or rational bias. Ito (1990) found
that forecasters in the survey he evaluated, which diﬀerentiated between forecasters from diﬀerent
industries, were slightly biased towards forecasting movements in the exchange rate that would
please their employer most (wishful thinking hypothesis), but did not resolve whether this bias was
unintentional or a strategic reaction on the part of the forecasters to incentives they faced Laster et
al (1999) proposed that forecasters are remunerated or rewarded based on both the accuracy of their
forecasts (which will facilitate better internal decision making within the company they work for)
as well as the publicity they command for the company. These two objectives could be in conﬂict
and the weight placed on one goal relative to the other is likely to vary across industries Despite
ﬁndings that consensus forecasts are more accurate than almost any individual and the fact that
they are readily available to forecasters, many forecasters still regularly provide forecasts relatively
far from the consensus The results of the empirical study by Laster et al (1999) suggest that industry
members, such as banks, which are likely to value accuracy highly, tend to make forecasts in line
with the consensus forecast, whereas independent forecasters who are likely to beneﬁt substantially
from publicity tended to forecast the outliers. Another potential explanation of rational bias in the
forecasts of professional economists is the signalling hypothesis by Ashiya and Doi (2001), which
proposes that forecasters who make forecasts that are diﬀerent to the consensus may be signalling
conﬁdence, and conversely, forecasters who are weak are likely to remain close to the consensus
to avoid being identiﬁed as particularly weak. Ashiya (2009) argues that there is little empirical
evaluation of the validity of these hypotheses. He used a 26-year panel of annual GDP growth
forecasts to rigorously test which of these hypotheses is supported empirically for GDP growth
forecasts and found that the data supported only the publicity hypothesis.
In conclusion, given the characteristics and incentives facing the rationally inattentive general
public, the media is likely to be the main source through which these people receive the communica-
tions of the central bank. Eﬀective communication of a central bank with the general public should
be designed with an understanding of the incentives of the media and professional economists who
inﬂuence the message that the general public ultimately receives. In the remaining part of the paper,
the South African news (the outcome of a strategic interaction between the SARB and the South
African media, economists and the general public) will be analysed empirically This analysis aims
to determine the role that the South African media has played in transmitting the communications
of the SARB to the general public since 2000.
3 Empirical method
Berger, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2006) evaluate central bank communication according to two
criteria — the extent of the media coverage, and its favourableness (how well the decision is understood
rather than how popular it is). Using similar indices to evaluate the communication of the SARB will
oﬀer insight into the degree to which the SARB has succeeded in reaching the public and whether
its communication succeeds in convincing the media that the policy decision was the correct one,
given the economic environment
The creation of the two indices for South Africa will be discussed in section 3.1, followed by
exploratory data analysis in section 3.2 Section 3.3 proposes some factors that potentially correlate
with the indices COV and ASS and section 3.4 tests the relevance of these factors with more formal
ordered probit regression analyses.
73.1 Construction of the indices
3.1.1 Qualitative index
Following Berger et al (2006) two index variables were constructed to describe the extent of coverage
and assessment of the SARB’s monetary policy decisions by South African newspapers. Relevant
newspaper reports were collected from the week following each MPC (monetary policy committee)
meeting. Media reports for the entire sample period of January 2000 to September 2009 were
collected via an electronic archive of media clippings (SAMedia), compiled at the University of
the Free State Careful attention was paid to ensure that the leading South African newspapers
(by circulation numbers)3 were represented in the media clippings collected and cartoons were also
included, recognising their role in opinion formation The Daily Sun (the country’s leading daily
newspaper by circulation numbers) and the Sunday Sun (a weekly newspaper with substantial
readership) were not represented in the SAMedia archive, so these were sourced directly from the
compact storage archives of the Media24 central library at the company’s head oﬃce4 Table AI in
the Appendix records ﬁndings for the main newspapers5 included in the study and a few details of
each.
Each article or cartoon was read and evaluated independently by two researchers to allow the
construction of the two indices. A qualitative index was created to capture the assessment of each
monetary policy decision (ASS) .T h i sm e a s u r e st h ed e g r e et ow h i c ht h em e d i ar e g a r d st h eS A R B ’ s
monetary policy decision as appropriate, given the economic environment (it does not indicate the
popularity of the decision). The index ranges from -2 (reﬂecting a strongly negative response of the
publication to the policy decision) to 2 (reﬂecting strong approval of the decision).
The creation of this qualitative index is inherently subjective. Both objective and subjective
approaches to creating indices have been proposed in the literature, but in line with the arguments
in Reid and Du Plessis (2008), the subjective approach was preferred. To limit the bias introduced
by this subjectivity as far as possible, two researchers independently read each media article and
assigned an index value for the assessment of each article. They then discussed each article and its
s c o r ea n dw h e r et h e i rs c o r e sd i ﬀered they agreed on a consensus index value for each.
The two researchers made some preliminary observations after reading the media articles. It was
noted that generally the economic content of the articles was of a low quality. There were many
mistakes in economic reasoning and a misunderstanding of the inﬂation targeting system. Although
this understanding did improve over time, even years after the introduction of the inﬂation targeting
framework misunderstandings of the fundamental issues were not uncommon For example, in June
2006, the editorial of the Business Day displayed a misunderstanding of the forward-looking nature
of monetary policy and the ﬂexibility with which the SARB conducts inﬂation targeting.
“The Bank’s inﬂation-targeting mandate now doesn’t permit it to let inﬂation go above the 6%
c e i l i n go ft h et a r g e tr a n g ef o re v e nas i n g l em o n t h . ”
(Business Day, 9 June 2006: 10)
Similarly, the following extract from the editorial of the City Press in 2008 claims that the SARB
is employing strict inﬂation targeting where the Bank places no weight at all on economic growth
“Calls to have the bank’s mandate expanded to include job creation appear to be justiﬁed. The
exclusive focus on ﬁghting inﬂation has meant that borrowing money is expensive and the credit
squeeze has compounded the problem.”
(City Press, 14 December 2008: 26)
3The SAARF AMPS surveys were used to identify the leading newspapers by readership numbers.
4Gratitude is expressed to Leonie Klootwyk at the Media24 library for her assistance.
5Articles from other newspapers were also occasionally represented in the sample, as they were identiﬁed as relevant
in the searches of the SAMedia archive. However, the newspapers in Table I were identiﬁed as having sizable readership
numbers, and therefore, special attention was given to ensure that these were represented in the sample.
8Fortunately, Mervyn King’s (1997) ‘inﬂation nutter’ (who places no weight on any objective but
inﬂation) is a hypothetical character, an extreme case scenario and there is no evidence that the
SARB deserves such a title. A reading of the SARB’s constitutional mandate makes it clear that
even the pursuance of price stability as the primary (not exclusive) objective of the Bank is done
with the intention of improving the prospects for economic growth in South Africa.
“... to protect the value of the currency of the Republic in the interest of balanced and sustainable
growth in the Republic.”
(South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989, amended: 3)
Some newspapers made more eﬀort to grapple with the system than others, which was probably
inﬂuenced by the perceived demands of their audiences (as discussed in section 2.3). For example,
the Business Day devoted notably more valuable newspaper space and journalistic eﬀort to reporting
on monetary policy decisions than the Daily Sun did. However, many of the media reports consisted
of undigested patch writing, which reﬂected little eﬀort to evaluate the policy decisions. They often
relied extensively on quoting market economists and were internally inconsistent (especially if the
economists quoted did not agree).
There appeared to be a general bias indicating that repo rate cuts were welcomed and rises
were met with criticism. Cartoons (such as those included below) were often amazingly extreme
and mostly negative (although their satirical nature is acknowledged). They often attributed to
Governor Mboweni intent and power that seems misplaced. The two examples reproduced were
hardly exceptional in this regard.
3.1.2 Quantitative index
The second index is a quantitative index that was created to measure the extent of the media coverage
(COV) given This index ranges from 1, representing poor media coverage, to 5, representing very
extensive media coverage. The criteria used to allocate values for the quantitative index are the size
of the article, its position in the newspaper, and its authorship.
In line with media industry practice (VMS, 2006), the standard advertising unit (SAU) or column
inch was used to compare the size of each article. Using a ruler to measure the length and width
and then multiplying the two (see appendix for further details), the column inch measure (a single
number) was calculated for each article. The result is a continuous series of numbers, which was
divided into 5 groups (percentiles) distinguishing articles according to size The extent of the coverage
also accounts for the position of the article in the newspaper, recognising for example that an article
on the front page represents better coverage of the SARB’s communication than an article on page
5 Finally, the authorship of each article is considered, speciﬁcally whether the article was written by
one of the newspaper’s own staﬀ,r e ﬂecting that greater importance was placed on the issue reported
on or whether the article was a Sapa or Reuters article
In order to account for all of these factors, a protocol was designed to categorise the extent of the
coverage of each article (see Table I). The size of the article is captured by the rows. The smallest
articles are in the top row (article size 1) and the largest are in the bottom row (article size 5). The
location and authorship of the articles are captured in the columns, which are ranked from those
that are allocated the prime positions and attention of the newspaper’s staﬀ in the leftmost column
to those allocated the lowest ranked locations and little attention from the staﬀ in the rightmost
column. For example, the ﬁrst column from the left represents front page articles written by the
newspaper’s own staﬀ. Note that the protocol illustrated by Table I is not necessarily symmetrical.
In addition, as discussed earlier, cartoons were also included in the sample. All cartoons were
allocated a quantitative index value of 4 (irrespective of their size and location).
93.2 Exploratory data analysis
Firstly, the index data created was evaluated using frequency tables The rows of frequency table 1
(Table II) reﬂect whether the repo rate was cut held constant or raised at each MPC meeting, and the
columns represent the values (between -2 and 2) of the assessment index allocated to media reports
in the week following each MPC meeting. The ﬁrst 5 columns of numbers reﬂect the frequency with
which each case occurred in the sample period. For example the top lefthand cell shows that on 12
occasions a cut in the repo rate was followed by media reports with an index value of -2. The last 5
columns reﬂect the same information as a proportion of the row total. For example, 7% of the time
a repo rate cut was followed by media reports with an assessment index of -2.
Due to the imprecise nature of the data itself, it is useful to consider broader categorisations,
which highlight clearer trends. When the repo rate was cut (top row), 45% of the media reports
received favourable assessments (either p(1) or p(2)) and 29% of the media reports received neutral
assessments This suggests that the vast majority of the time a repo rate cut was not judged to
have been inappropriate, given the economic environment. Almost half (45%) of the media reports
following decisions to keep the repo rate constant (second row) were neutral and a large proportion
(29%) were only slightly positive. The strongest result occurred in cases where the repo rate was
raised (third row); 57% of the media reports were given an unfavourable assessment (either p(-2) or
p(-1)).
If we assume that neither the MPC nor the media is biased and we assume that there is no
uncertainty about the economic environment, then we would expect the SARB and the media to
agree on the appropriate monetary policy stance In reality there is uncertainty about the economic
environment and the data analysis reveals a pattern of systematic, negative assessments by the
media when the repo rate is raised The uncertain economic environment cannot be responsible for
this systematic pattern, so it must be the result of bias, by either the MPC or the media.
A range of statistics and empirical evaluations of the SARB’s track record are available to evaluate
the claim that this observed pattern is the result of an overly ‘hawkish’ SARB. If the SARB displayed
a bias towards tightening, inﬂation would consistently have been either within or below the inﬂating
targeting band over the sample period Instead, the targeted inﬂation rate was above the upper band
for approximately 60% of the sample period. In addition, empirical analyses by Woglom (2003)
and Ortiz and Sturzenegger (2007) of the SARB’s reaction ﬁnd that the SARB places a substantial
weight on output. Woglom (2003) ﬁnds that the SARB placed more weight on output during the
inﬂation targeting period than in the period immediately prior to the adoption of inﬂation targeting
and Ortiz and Stuzenegger (2007) argue that the weight devoted to output in the reaction function
of the SARB is relatively high compared with other emerging market economies The 18 — 24 month
target horizon of the SARB also bares testament to the ﬂexible manner in which the SARB has
implemented monetary policy because it allows the SARB discretion and ﬂexibility in pursuing the
inﬂation target (Du Plessis, 2007) Shortterm breaches of the inﬂation target will be tolerated by
the SARB as long as inﬂation is expected to move back within the range before the end of the
target horizon In addition, the fact that the inﬂation targeting regime has lasted almost a decade is
impressive by modern standards and again reﬂects the ﬂexibility the framework allows in handling
diﬀerent situations (Du Plessis, 2007). In conclusion there is no evidence of bias by the SARB
towards tightening monetary policy. By deduction, the assessment index seems to simply reﬂect
that the media is pleased when the repo rate is decreased, reducing the cost of credit and unhappy
w h e nt h eo p p o s i t eo c c u r s( r e ﬂecting the popularity of the decision) On average, these results reﬂect
little attempt by journalists to judge the appropriateness of each decision, based on an understanding
of the institutional framework and economic circumstances
Tables III and IV are the frequency tables for the two subcomponents (size and location) of the
composite index, COV,a n dT a b l eVr e ﬂects the frequency tables for the composite index, COV
Table III reﬂect little variation in the size of the articles across categories (they are all around 0.20),
although using the broader categorisations does reveal some weak associations. When the repo rate
10was cut, 0.46 of the articles were small (size 1 or 2); when it was kept constant 0.41 of the articles
were small; and when it was raised 0.36 were small. In contrast, the proportion of the articles that
were large was 0.36 when the rate was cut, 0.38 when it was held constant and 0.43 when it was
raised. In summary rate cuts were associated with the smallest media articles and rises in the repo
rate resulted in larger articles. The article size varied based on the direction of the monetary policy
decision, rather than on an evaluation of the appropriateness thereof.
According to Table IV, very few media reports are in location 1, which represents articles that
are not on pages 1-3 or the Business Report and are not written by the newspaper’s own staﬀ.
There are also very few reports in category 3, which represents articles on pages 2, 3 or the in the
Business Report, but which are not written by the newspaper’s own staﬀ. The clearest result is
that articles are more likely to appear in the prime locations and to be reported by the newspaper’s
own staﬀ (categories 4 or 5) when the repo rate is cut (0.42) or raised (0.43) than when the rate is
held constant (029). The location of the articles appears to depend on whether the repo rate was
adjusted, rather than on the level of disagreement with the decision.
The composite index, extent of coverage (COV)( T a b l eV )ﬁnds that few reports fall into category
0 (the weakest coverage) and there is little variation across categories 1 4. The clearest results are
that again articles are more likely (0.50 and 0.51 of the time) to fall into categories 3 and 4 (greatest
extent of coverage) when the repo rate is changed than when it is held constant (0.43 of the time).
Formal regression techniques are adopted in the following section, which oﬀers some insight into
the robustness of the results from the four frequency tables above.
3.3 Factors tht correlate with the extent of media coverage and assess-
ment of monetary policy by the media
A list of factors that are likely to inﬂuence COV and ASS are listed below Berger et al (2006) included
determinants related to the ECB’s policy decisions and communication, the economic environment
and because they were using panel data for a number of EU countries, country-speciﬁc conditions
were considered Similar factors related to the SARB’s policy decisions and communication, and its
economic environment were identiﬁed in this paper, but the countryspeciﬁc variables were irrelevant
as only South Africa was investigated.
Monetary policy surprise:
Two dummy variables were created, surprise up and surprise down, to indicate whether the
particular monetary policy decision was a surprise in either direction For the surprise up variable,
a value of 1 was allocated if the Banker’s Acceptance rate (BA) rate changed by 0.25 or more on
the day of the MPC’s monetary policy announcement, reﬂecting that either monetary authorities
increased the repo rate when the ﬁnancial markets did not expect them to, or they increased the
repo rate more than the markets had predicted. Otherwise, the variable was allocated a value of 0.
The surprise down variable received a 1 if the BA rate changed by -0.25 or more, and 0 otherwise.
Berger et al (2006) did not make the distinction between a surprise up and a surprise down, but
the frequency tables in the previous section suggested that the distinction would be valuable for
analysing the South African media.
Adjustment of the repo rate:
Four dummy variables (100 decrease, 50 decrease, 50 rise, 100 rise) were constructed to capture
adjustments made to the repo rate. The dummy variables were used to diﬀerentiate between up-
ward adjustments of 0 50 basis points (bp) (50 rise), upward adjustments of 51 100 bp (100 rise),
downward adjustments of 0 50 bp (50 decrease) and downward adjustments of 51 100 bp (100 de-
crease) It was deemed appropriate to investigate the potentially asymmetrical reactions to upward
and downward adjustments of the repo rate that were suggested by the frequency tables
GDP growth relative to the sample average:
By subtracting the average GDP growth for the sample period from the actual GDP growth
for each period, the variable GDP:Avg was constructed to reﬂect where GDP growth was situated
11relative to the trend over the sample period. A positive (negative) value indicates that the economy
is growing faster (slower) than the average for the sample period. This variable was constructed
using realtime data6 from the original statistical releases archived on the STATS SA website.
Inﬂation outside the inﬂation targeting range:
Av a r i a b l eoutside range was used to measure inﬂation relative to the target band. A value of
0 was assigned to the index when inﬂation was within the target range of 3-6% and 6% (3%) was
subtracted from the actual inﬂation ﬁgure in each period when inﬂation was above (below) the upper
(lower) limit of the target band, in order to capture the distance of inﬂation from the target. In line
with the discussion for the preceding variable, realtime data7 from the STATS SA website was used
to construct this inﬂation variable.
Adjustments of FED policy rates:
Two dummy variables were created to capture whether the SARB’s adjustments of the repo
rate were in line with the direction of the most recent change in the Fed Funds rate. A value of
1 was allocated to the variable F&S increase when the most recent change in the Fed Funds rate
was upward and was followed by the SARB increasing its policy rate, and a value of 0 otherwise.
Conversely, a value of 1 was allocated to the variable F&S decrease when the SARB’s reduction of
the repo rate is preceded by a downward movement of the Fed Funds rate. This variable is designed
to capture the degree to which the SARB’s decision is judged against that of the Fed. This variable
was constructed using data that was sourced from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s and the
South African Reserve Bank’s websites.
Inconsistency:
In Reid and Du Plessis (2010) on four occasions the SARB’s monetary policy actions were
judged to be inconsistent with its communication at the previous meeting. A dummy variable was
constructed for this paper in which these four instances are allocated a 1 and the rest of the MPC
decisions in the sample period a 0.
Inter-meeting communication:
A number of dummy variables were constructed to investigate whether they had any impact on
the assessment and extent of coverage with which the media reported on the following decisions The
inter-meeting communications considered were the monetary policy forums (MPF), monetary policy
reviews (MPR), quarterly bulletins (QB), parliamentary brieﬁngs (PB), speeches by the governor
(SP), annual general meetings (AGM) and the annual reports. All of these are occasions on which
the bank comments on monetary policy. Only speeches by the Governor of the Reserve Bank that
were relevant to South African monetary policy were included. It was also recognised that the MPR
is released on the evening of the ﬁrst MPF, so it is not possible to distinguish between the impacts of
the two and therefore, only the variable MPR was used to capture the impact of the two. Similarly,
the annual report is released oﬃcially on the evening of the AGM, so only the variable AGM was
used in the regression analysis.
3.4 Regression analysis
Following the approach of Berger et al (2006), ordered probit models were used to identify factors
that correlate with the extent of media coverage. Berger et al use panel data to evaluate the role of
the media in the constituent countries of the European Union, whereas this study focuses on South
African time series data alone. The panel data has the advantage of allowing the use of ﬁxed eﬀects
to limit the impact of the subjectivity of the experts who created the indices.
6GDP data usually undergoes numerous revisions after the ﬁr s tr e l e a s eo ft h ed a t at ot h ep u b l i c ,s oi ft h eﬁnal
historical time series is downloaded and used for empirical work, it is ignoring the fact that that was often not the
information available to decision makers at the time the decision was made. The ﬁgures used in these regressions are
the ﬁrst releases of GDP data for that quarter.
7The inﬂation index used was the one oﬃcially targeted by the SARB. Therefore, CPIX was used until the end of
2008, and CPI thereafter.
12Models 1 4 (Table VI) investigate whether there is a relationship between COV and ASS in the
media reports. The dependent variable is COV Model 1 (column 1) tested whether there is a linear
relationship between COV and ASS, and model 2 whether there is a relationship between COV and
absolute assessment The coeﬃcients on assessment in Model 1 and absolute assessment in Model 2
were both signiﬁcant Furthermore, when both assessment and absolute assessment were included in
the same regression in Model 3, absolute assessment dominated, so there does not appear to be a
robust linear relationship between COV and ASS Model 4 included absolute assessment and negative
assessment to test whether the relationship between COV and ASS is non-linear The coeﬃcient on
negative assessment was insigniﬁcant at the standard 1%, 5% and 10% levels, but given the imprecise
nature of the data its p-value of 18.5% does not convincingly rule out the possibility of a non-linear
relationship These results are in line with the main ﬁndings from the frequency tables for COV
indicating that changes in the repo rate are more likely to receive a greater extent of coverage than a
decision to keep the repo rate constant The signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient on assessment in Model
1 and the marginally signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on negative assessment in Model 4 also indicate that
COV possibly increases slightly when ASS is negative. However, this result is less conclusive.
Regressions 5 - 10 in Table VII aim to identify factors in our list that correlate with ASS.M o d e l5
is the most parsimonious of the models and includes the variables identiﬁed as most likely to inﬂuence
the assessment in media reports. The regression results indicate that a large decrease in the repo
rate (a 100bp decrease) has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on the assessment, and any increase of the
repo rate (either 50 or 100 basis points) has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect. This regression reinforces
the results of the frequency tables. The two variables outside range and GDP:Avg are designed
to capture the monitoring role of the media, based on the economic circumstances. Although the
coeﬃcient on outside range is only signiﬁcant at the 12,8% level of signiﬁcance, as before, the
imprecise nature of this data means that this positive coeﬃcient cannot convincingly be judged to
be insigniﬁcant. However, ASS is most strongly aﬀected by a rise in the repo rate, which elicits a
signiﬁcantly negative report.
In Model 6, the variables surprise up and surprise down were included instead of the four
dummy variables representing adjustments of the repo rate. The reason that these surprise variables
are not included with the repo rate adjustment variables is that they have a substantial degree of
collinearlity8. However, both groups of variables were expected to exert an inﬂuence on assessment,
so Model 6 was estimated to check whether there was any important change in the regression results
when the ﬁrst set of variables were replaced with the second. The results reﬂect a similar pattern to
those of Model 5. A surprise adjustment of the repo rate upward had a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect
and a surprise adjustment downward, a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect on assessment. In addition, GDP:
Avg had a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient, which is interpreted as an indication that an increase in
the repo rate is generally given an unfavourable assessment when it is viewed as potentially harming
robust economic growth. However, this ﬁnding is not robust, as it is not signiﬁcant in the other
speciﬁcations of the model.
Model 7 is an expansion of Model 5, where the variables inconsistency, F&S increase,a n dF&S
decrease are added to the model. The positive coeﬃcient on the large decrease in the repo rate
and the negative coeﬃcients on the variables that capture the increases in the repo rate remain
signiﬁcant, conﬁrming the robustness of these results, but the slightly signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient
on the variable capturing whether inﬂation is outside the target band is no longer signiﬁcant. In
addition, the variable that captures when the Fed and the SARB are both increasing their policy
rates is also slightly signiﬁcant and positive. This suggests that increases in the South African repo
rate are more readily accepted when the policy rate of the Fed is also being increased at that time. It
is interesting that the response is asymmetrical in that there is no signiﬁcant impact on assessment
when both central banks are reducing rates.
The inter-meeting communication variables are introduced in Model 8. This is done in order to
8This was conﬁrmed using auxiliary regressions, regressing the repo rate changes on surprise up and surprise down.
13investigate whether inter-meeting communication by the SARB is eﬀective at inﬂuencing evaluation
of the policy decisions by the media. The negative coeﬃcient on the AGM variable is highly signiﬁ-
cant, the positive coeﬃcient on the Quarterly Bulletin is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, and the negative
coeﬃcient on parliamentary brieﬁngs is marginally signiﬁcant. The robustness of the impacts of the
inter-meeting communication variables was tested using slightly diﬀerent speciﬁcations of Model
8. The impact of the AGM on assessment remained highly signiﬁcant and negative, and the QB
variable was consistently positive and signiﬁcant as the model was adjusted. The persistently sig-
niﬁcant, negative impact of the AGM was surprising and warranted further investigation. On closer
inspection, it was conﬁrmed that this result was being driven by only two points (the AGMs of
2002 and 2003)9. Once a dummy variable was created to control for these two occasions (Model 9),
the impact of the AGMs became insigniﬁcant. The ﬁndings reﬂect little inﬂuence of inter-meeting
communication on the evaluation of monetary policy by the media — only the QB variable has a
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on assessment.
A range of ‘goodness of ﬁt’ measures have been proposed in the literature, and a few of these
will be considered here to assess the adequacy of the proposed models. This range of measures is
used due to the comparative diﬃculty in assessing the quality of a model with limited dependent
variable. According to Wooldridge (2002:465), for logit and probit models “goodness of ﬁti sn o t
as important as the statistical and economic signiﬁcance of the explanatory variables”. In addition,
various Pseudo-R squareds commonly used to evaluate the ﬁt of a model with a limited dependent
variable have fewer intuitive interpretations.
Firstly, contingency tables were considered for each of the regressions, allowing type 1 and 2
errors to be identiﬁed. Table VIII presents the contingency table for Model 9, where the frequency
of each index value between -2 and 2 as per the actual index are presented horizontally in row, and
the frequency of each level of assessment predicted by the model is presented in the columns.
It is immediately evident that the variables included in the model lead to a skewed distribution
of predictions. Although the total values of the actual index (ﬁnal column) are relatively normally
distributed across the index values, the model never predicts the assessment of -1 or 2. Most of the
variables included in the models are dummy variables, so to test that it was not their discrete nature
that made it more diﬃcult for the model to increase from one index value to the next, a number of
the variables were changed to continuous regressors. Changes in the repo rate were represented by
one variable, policy change; one variable was constructed to capture the magnitude and direction
of the surprise experienced in reaction to policy changes, and continuous variables were created to
capture the diﬀerence between the policy changes of the Federal Reserve Bank and the SARB. These
changes did not improve the ability of the model to predict -1 and 2 index values and diminished
the quality of the model. Most importantly, the four dummy variables were preferable in order
to capture the diﬀerent responses to the speciﬁc direction and magnitude of the policy changes.
Therefore, the regressors in question were returned to their original forms.
The skew predictions of the models suggest that the variables included in the models are more
sensitive to MPC decisions that elicit a strongly negative reaction. This is consistent with the
robust ﬁnding that the coeﬃcient on the variable F&S increase is marginally signiﬁcant, but that on
F&S decrease is insigniﬁcant. This suggests that assessments in media reports are more favourable
towards increases of the SARB’s repo rate that are preceded by an increase in the Fed Funds rate,
whereas a decrease in the SARB’s repo rate that is preceded by a decrease in the Fed’s policy rate
has no signiﬁcant impact. The media is more sensitive when the SARB is tightening monetary policy
than when it is loosening it, and they are more likely to accept the SARB’s decision if it is not out
of step with the Fed’s monetary policy.
9The SARB AGMs of 2002 and 2003 were uncharacteristically newsworthy. Media reports following the AGM
of 2003 focused strikingly on Governor Mboweni’s salary increase, which was far above the inﬂation target, and
on shareholder activism at the SARB’s AGM. In turn, media reports following the 2002 AGM were dominated by
disagreement between the SARB Governor and the Minister of Finance regarding who should be responsible for
banking regulation. Dramatic language used in these report such as “Mboweni and Manuel lock horns”, “clash on
bank supervision out in the open” and “low intensity war” captures the negative mood created by their disagreement.
14To improve the model’s ability to predict, the index was reduced to a coarser grid, where all
negative index values are represented as -1 and all positive index values by 1 (Model 10 in Table
VII). The results are very similar to those of Model 9, except that now none of the inter-meeting
communication variables seem to inﬂuence assessment.
Table IX presents the contingency table for Model 10, and these results are used to identify the
true (false) positives and true (false) negatives in Table X. When ASS is simpliﬁed in this way, the
model is able to predict all three index values. The true positives represent the proportion of the time
that the model correctly predicted that a speciﬁc index value would occur. For example, according
to the top left cell, 58% of the time the model correctly predicted a negative index value. The false
positives capture the proportion of the time that the model incorrectly predicted that speciﬁci n d e x
value, which is the type 1 error). Similarly, the false negatives represent the type 2 errors, where
the model incorrectly predicts that assessment will not be a speciﬁc index value. For example, the
top right-hand cell reports that 22% of the time when the model predicted that assessment would
not be 1, it was indeed 1.
According to Table X, the model is far more susceptible to type 1 errors than type 2 errors. In
addition, the type 1 errors deteriorate as we move down the rows from -1 - 1, which is a result of the
skewed distribution of the model predictions, given the independent variables of the model. To gauge
how far wrong the model predicts when it does predict incorrectly, the percentage of predictions that
were more than one cell away from the correct predictions were considered. When the true value
of the assessment index was -1, 29% of the time the model mistakenly predicted a 1, and when the
true index value was 1, 20% of the time the model mistakenly predicted -1. The type 1 and 2 errors
identiﬁed for Models 5 - 9 are similar to those of Model 10 and are available from the authors on
request.
To further evaluate the adequacy of this model, various other measures of ﬁtw e r ec o n s i d e r e d
(Greene and Hensher, 2010 and UCLA: Academic Technology Services, 2010). Due to the nature
of these models, the measures of ﬁt can either compare the ability of competing models to ﬁtt h e
data, or compare the model to the null hypothesis of ‘no model’(in the sense of a model with only a
constant as a regressor) (Greene and Hensher, 2010). For example, McFadden’s pseudo R-squared
considers the likelihood ratios to assess the degreet ow h i c ht h ef u l lm o d e li m p r o v e so nt h ei n t e r c e p t
model. McFadden’s pseudo R-squared for Model 10 is 0.077.
More revealing, and related to the analysis in the tables above, are the Count R-squared and
adjusted count R-squared goodness of ﬁt measures. The count R-squared provides a scalar that
represents the percentage correctly predicted by the model. The count R-squared for Model 10 is
0.478. The adjusted count R-squared adjusts this measure to control for the modeller’s ‘best guess’.
In a bivariate model where one outcome is obviously more likely than the other, by simply guessing
the more likely outcome all the time, the modeller would be correct most of the time (UCLA:
Academic Technology Services, 2010). To apply this to our multivariate case, we adjusted the count
R-squared by 0.333 (assuming that each of the three categories has an equal probability of being
chosen):
R2 =( No.correctly predicted − count of the most frequent outcome) / (3)
(Total obs − count of the most frequent outcome)
The adjusted count R-squared for Model 10 is 0.215, so the model is 21,5% better than a rea-
sonable guess that each category of the index is equally likely.
Models 11 - 13 investigate some factors that potentially correlate with the extent of coverage
(COV). The coeﬃcient on absolute coverage is consistently positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that
the more extreme the assessment the greater the extent of coverage. All the other coeﬃcients are
clearly insigniﬁcant, except Outside π range, which is consistently positive and signiﬁcant. This is
an indication that the media does play some monitoring role in that they increase media coverage
of monetary policy when the SARB is not achieving the goal of keeping inﬂa t i o nw i t h i nt h et a r g e t
15range, which it communicated to the public. This is the easiest measure against which to gauge the
performance of the SARB, and by increasing media coverage during these periods, the media has
‘placed monetary policy on the agenda’. Monetary policy oﬃcials should recognise that the general
public, via the agenda-setting behaviour of the media, are sensitised during these periods.
The contingency table for Model 13 reﬂected a similar pattern as Models 5 - 10. The model
does not predict any COV index values of 0 or 2, which can be explained by the fact that the index
values of 0 and 2 were the least frequent in the actual data (as is clear from the exploratory data
analysis). McFadden’s pseudo R-squared for Model 13 is 0.0363, the count R-squared is 0.348 and
the adjusted count R-squared is 0.185. The results for Models 11 and 12 are similar to those for
Model 1310.
By comparing the results above of Models 5-13 with those of Berger et al. (2006) for the
European media, we can potentially gain more insight into the role of the South African media in
the expectations transmission mechanism of monetary policy in South Africa.
4 C o m p a r i s o nw i t hE C Br e s u l t s
Berger et al (2006) ﬁnd that in practice the European media positions itself to play a monitoring
role, and it tends to report critical views more extensively than positive views. The results show
that the tone of the reporting is more negative when the markets are surprised by a monetary
policy decision, and when the latest inﬂation ﬁgure is above 2% (the ECB’s deﬁnition of price
stability). More crucially, the ﬁndings suggest that more inter-meeting communication, and ECB
press conferences on the day of the monetary policy decisions that provide more information lead
to media coverage that is both more extensive and favourable. Although they ﬁnd that reporting is
always more negative when inﬂation is high, the surprising decisions appear to be better accepted
when they are accompanied by extensive explanations and supported with information.
In contrast, the results of this study indicate that the South African media plays far less of a
monitoring role in that the economic variables GDP:Avg and outside band, seemed to have a limited
impact on assessment, although being outside the inﬂation target band did increase the extent
of coverage. These economic variables were far outweighed by what appeared to be an uncritical
response to adjustments of the repo rate (particularly increases in the repo rate). Finally, inter-
meeting communication does not seem to have had much impact, suggesting that the SARB is not
making eﬀective use of inter-meeting communication to inﬂuence the perceptions of the Bank by the
media and public. A more deliberate attempt to understand its audience would potentially allow
the SARB to improve its use of this channel of communication.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The monetary policy framework adopted by the SARB, inﬂation targeting, relies greatly on the
expectations channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The strategic interaction be-
tween central banks and ﬁnancial markets has been extensively studied enabling much more informed
policy actions and communication. Comparatively little focus has been dedicated to understanding
the communication of central banks with the general public. This paper explored the role of the
South African newspaper media in the expectations channel of the transmission mechanism of the
SARB. The paper does not model the transmission mechanism via the media so it cannot comment
on the nature of the media’s impact on expectations, but it does build an argument that the media
does aﬀect their expectations in some way (i.e. the media matters). The objective was to systemat-
ically investigate the process by which the SARB’s communication is transformed into news, which
will impact on the inﬂation expectations of the general public (potentially the source of much of
10The results for models 10 — 12 are available from the corresponding author on request.
16South Africa’s wage and price pressures). The results reﬂect a relative lack of critical assessment of
monetary policy by the media, which limits the degree to which the SARB is held accountable to
the public against its stated objectives. The media does increase the extent of coverage when the
SARB is outside of the target range, but inter-meeting communication appears to be ineﬀective at
inﬂuencing the assessment of monetary policy decisions by the media. There is scope for the SARB
to use communication to consciously engage with the media, in order to make use of this opportunity
to contribute to the level of economic evaluation undertaken by stakeholders and build credibility.
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Standard column inches 
 
‘Standard  Advertising  Unit  Column  Inches’  are  typically  used  to  sell  or  compare  space  in  a 
newspaper.  If,  as  was  the  case  for  this  study,  the  media  material  is  paper-based  (rather  than 
electronic), the SAU column inches are calculated using a ruler (VMS, 2006). Measuring horizontally, 
the width of the article is represented as number of SAU columns, using the list below: 
 
  1 SAU column = 2 1/16” 
  2 SAU column = 4 1/4” 
  3 SAU column = 6 7/16” 
  4 SAU column = 8 5/8” 
  5 SAU column = 10 13/16” 
  6 SAU column = 13” 
 
Then the length of the articles is measured in inches, and the two measurements are multiplied to 






Newspaper title  Characteristics  AMPS  
(% of adult population that read these newspapers) 
Business Day  National; Daily  0.3% 
City Press  Weekly  6.5% 
Daily Sun  Daily  14% 
Rapport  Weekly  4.5% 
Sowetan  Daily  4.7% 
Sunday Sun  Weekly  8.3% 
Sunday Times  National; Weekly  12.6% 
 
Source: (AMPS, 2009A)  
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1  3  2  1  1  0  0 
2  3  3  2  1  1  0 
3  3  3  2  1  1  0 
4  4  3  3  1  1  1 
5  4  4  3  2  2  1 
 
Source: Own construction 
 
 







Assessment of the media reports in the week following each MPC meeting 
  
               Total                
-2  -1  0  1  2    p(-2)  p(-1)  p(0)  p(1)  p(2) 
Cut  12  30  47  46  26  161  0.07  0.19  0.29  0.29  0.16 
Constant  13  20  72  48  10  163  0.08  0.12  0.44  0.29  0.06 




   
 
Table III: Frequency table for quantitative index, size 
 
Change  in 
the  repo 
rate at each 
MPC 
meeting 
Size of the media reports in the week following each MPC meeting 
  
               Total                
1  2  3  4  5    p(1)  p(2)  p(3)  p(4)  p(5) 
Cut  35  29  24  20  30  138  0.25  0.21  0.17  0.14  0.22 
Constant  27  31  30  32  21  141  0.19  0.22  0.21  0.23  0.15 
Rise  26  26  30  32  28  142  0.18  0.18  0.21  0.23  0.20 
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Table IV: Frequency table for quantitative index, location 
 
Change  in 
the  repo 
rate at each 
MPC 
meeting 
Location of the media reports in the week following each MPC meeting 
  
                  Total                   
1  2  3  4  5  6    p(1)  p(2)  p(3)  p(4)  p(5)  p(6) 
Cut  4  43  4  28  35  24  138  0.03  0.31  0.03  0.20  0.25  0.17 
Constant  6  58  0  35  26  16  141  0.04  0.41  0.00  0.25  0.18  0.11 












Extent of coverage of the media reports in the week following each MPC meeting 
  
               Total                
0  1  2  3  4    p(0)  p(1)  p(2)  p(3)  p(4) 
Cut  11  33  35  45  37  161  0.07  0.20  0.22  0.28  0.23 
Constant  15  46  32  38  32  163  0.09  0.28  0.20  0.23  0.20 




   
 
Table VI: The relationship between COV and ASS in media reports 
 
Dependent variable: COV  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3   Model 4  
Assessment   -0.085**    --   -0.050    --  
Absolute assessment   --   0.438***   0.427***    0.388***   
Negative assessment   --   --   --   0.153 
(0.185)   
          Number of observations   500   500   500   500  
 
Note: Models 1 - 4 are ordered probit regressions, and the regression coefficients are represented in the cells. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. ***, ** and * signify that a variable is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, and numbers in brackets appear below coefficients where the p-value 
is between 10 and 25%. 
 
 
   




Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8  Model 9  Model 10 
Surprise up  --  -0.598***  --  --  --  -- 
Surprise down  --  0.359**  --  --  --  -- 
100 decrease  0.245*  --  0.030*  0.341**  0.394**  0.355* 
50 decrease  0.061  --  -0.086  -0.037  -0.008  -0.107 
50 rise  -0.713***  --  -0.861***  -0.819***  -0.847***  -0.949*** 




Outside range  -0.053 
(0.128) 




0.021  0.022 
GDP:Avg  -0.019  -0.042**  0.016  0.016  -0.020  0.019 
Inconsistency   --  --  0.078  -0.076  0.060  0.046 







F&S decrease  --    -0.137  -0.095  -0.002  -0.023 
MPR  --  --  --  -0.064  0.094  -0.009 
Q. Bulletin  --  --  --  0.267**  0.206*  0.137 
Parliamentary 
briefings 
--  --  --  -0.135 
(0.161) 
-0.108  -0.091 
Speeches  --  --  --  0.062  0.033  0.062 
AGM  --  --  --  -0.535***  -0.227  -0.228 
D_AGM(02&03)          -0.769***  -0.955*** 
             
Observations  500  500  500  500  500  500 
 
Note: Models 1 - 4 are ordered probit regressions and the regression coefficients are represented in the cells. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. ***, ** and * signify that a variable is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, and numbers in brackets appear below coefficients where the p-value 
is between 10 and 20%. 
 
 




















ASSESSMENT PREDICTED BY THE MODEL 
  -2  0  1  Total 
-2  30  39  4  73 
-1  28  56  18  102 
0  17  103  39  159 
1  7  77  41  125 
2  1  20  20  41 
Total  83  295  122  500 
 
 



















  ASSESSMENT PREDICTED BY THE MODEL 
  -1  0  1  Total 
-1  106  17  52  175 
0  44  34  81  159 
1  34  27  105  166 
Total  184  78  238  500 
23Table X: Type 1 and 2 errors for Model 10 
 
  True positives  False positives  True negatives  False negatives 
-1  58%  42%  78%  22% 
0  44%  56%  70%  30% 
1  44%  56%  77%  23% 
 
 



















Note: Models 10 - 13 are ordered probit regressions and the regression coefficients are represented in the cells. 
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors were used. ***, ** and * signify that a variable is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, and numbers in brackets appear below coefficients where the p-value 



















































































































































































Inflation Expectations (for the current year) 
Financial Analysts  Business Sector 
Dependent variable: COV  Model 11  Model 12  Model 13 
Absolute assessment  0.443***  0.435***  0.448*** 
Surprise up  --  0.109  -- 
Surprise down  --  -0.056  -- 
100 decrease  0.124  --  0.149 
50 decrease  -0.018  --  -0.007 
50 rise  -0.045  --  -0.027 
100 rise  0.140  --  0.225 
Outside range  0.238**  0.262**  0.215* 
GDP > avg  0.135  0.111  0.128 
Inconsistency  --  --  -0.143 
F&S increase  --  --  -0.050 
F&S decrease  --  --  -0.062 
       
Number of observations  500  500  500 
24